As 'Europe' becomes more diverse, the countries that were formerly part of the USSR face new choices.
INTRODUCTION
The Cold War defined two rival spheres of influence. No less important, it defined two sets of identities. Whether or not they shared its objectives, citizens of the communist-ruled countries to the east were part of a larger system of values, alliances and institutions. Their societies defined themselves as a 'socialist community', in which a distinctive way of life-collectivist and materialist-had supposedly been consolidated. Their economies and political systems were interconnected; they shared the same external borders; and they defended them through the same military alliance. If they went on a foreign holiday, it would be to 1 Fewer than 7% visited any of the developed capitalist countries. See Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1987g. (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1988 2 The treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Community was signed in October 2000 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, and it came into force on 30 May 2001. Further information is available at: http://www.photius.com/eaec/ (10 October 2008). The Collective Security Treaty Organisation was established on 18 September 2003, following agreement by heads of the states who had signed the Treaty on Collective Security in May 1992 (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia and Tajikistan) to transform that treaty into an international, regional organisation. Further information on the CSTO is available at: http://www.cagateway.org/ en/topics/23/84/ (17 October 2008). The Single Economic Space was established in September 2003 during a summit of the Commonwealth of Independent states at Yalta; those states involved are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. 3 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a permanent, intergovernmental, international organisation established in June 2001 between China, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Further information is available at: http://www.sectsco.org/html/00026.html (17 October 2008) . GUAM, an association concerned with democracy and economic development, was established in 1997 as a consultative forum between four original members: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. 4 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: the map of civilization on the mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, 1994) . market economy) and a 'Slavic-Orthodox' civilisation in the east, also Christian, but one in which church and state were more closely related and foreign domination had lasted much longer. Differences of this kind, Huntington suggested, were the 'product of centuries', and 'far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes'. Belarus and Ukraine were divided by this cleavage; Russia was a 'torn country', wholly Orthodox but divided between two continents, and whether it was really 'European' or 'Asiatic' had been debated since at least the time of Pushkin's exchanges with Chadaev in the early nineteenth century. 5 In this paper, we seek to advance the discussion of these large and complex issues by focusing on self-perceptions in each of the three countries under considerationBelarus, Russia and Ukraine-in the spirit of the study of foreign relations that has become known as 'constructivism'. The aim, as Hopf has put it, is not only to show how a state's identities are produced in interactions with other states, but also how its identities are being produced in interaction with its own society and the many identities and discourses that constitute that society. 6 We look first of all at the 'Western' choice that faces these societies, then at the 'Slavic' choice and its rather different bases of support; we move on in our final section to consider the distribution of support for these alternative options across the three societies, and then examine the wider implications of these patterns. We draw our evidence from national representative surveys conducted between 2000 and 2008, which are themselves part of a larger and still continuing inquiry that incorporates focus groups and elite interviews as well as printed sources. 7 Full details of the surveys are provided in our appendix.
LOOKING 'WEST'
We begin our exploration of the 'Western' choice by examining the extent to which the mass public in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia define their own identity as at least partly 'European'. 8 Our results are set out in Table 1 (June, 2006), 165-90;  clearly. First of all, in every case European self-identity has been declining, rather than increasing, as the European Union extends its own boundaries: the greatest fall in respondents' self-identification as Europeans has been in Russia, at least until 2005, but the same trends are apparent in the other two countries. In 2000 about half our Russian and Belarusian respondents thought they were at least to some extent 'European', and more than a third of our Ukrainians thought the same; six or seven years later, the proportions were lower in every case, less strikingly in Belarus (which is consistently the most 'European' in its responses), but here too the proportion who 'seldom' or 'never' thought of themselves as Europeans had increased considerably. Ukrainian attitudes were relatively stable, but Russians were still more likely to have ceased to think of themselves as at least partly 'European', and they were the most likely 'seldom' or 'never' to do so. Those who claimed they 'never' felt European were about half of all our Ukrainian and Russian respondents in 2007 and 2008, respectively. In every case, except Belarus, this was the median response; in Belarus, in 2006, the largest single group of respondents 'seldom' thought of themselves as Europeans.
Identities are obviously multiple and polyvalent, and no single question is likely to yield an unambiguous set of responses. Accordingly, we asked a related set of questions using a wording modelled on the Eurobarometer, which allowed a wider range of responses and provided results that could, in principle, be compared across the entire continent. Our results are set out in Table 2 . Again, the main conclusions are clear. Overwhelmingly, in each case, our respondents felt their first identity was as a citizen of that country. Almost to the same extent, our respondents felt they were citizens of their local area or settlement; regional identities were also popular. Relatively few thought of their identity as European in the first or even the second place. Belarusians, who had been somewhat more likely to think of themselves as 'Europeans' in 2000, were also the most likely to identify themselves with a European identity, and the numbers were edging upwards. But even in Belarus a European identity came a long way behind an identity that was related to the state itself, or the locality, or the region in which their place of residence was located; in Russia a European identity was still less common, even in the parts of the country that are geographically European, and rather fewer conceived of themselves in this way than as Soviet citizens a decade or more after the demise of the USSR itself. Across the countries of the European Union, and indeed among those that have no immediate prospect of membership, levels of 'European' identification are considerably higher. The Eurobarometer routinely asks if respondents think of themselves as nationals of their own country, as Europeans, or as nationals of their own country and also Europeans. According to the exercise that was fielded during the period of our surveys, 55% across all the EU member countries thought they had at least a partly European identity, and 42% responded that they had only a national identity. Our own figures suggested a primary or secondary European identity in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia that was nowhere more than 20%, and a primary or secondary national identity that was nowhere less than 68%. This compared with a wholly or partly European identity that, among established EU member states, was nowhere less than 32% (in the United Kingdom), and among 2004 EU entrants nowhere less than 49% (in the Czech Republic; see Fig. 1 ). Levels of European identity in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia are not simply below those for all current and prospective EU member nations, defined on this basis: they are also below those for Turkey, a largely Asian country with no immediate prospect of EU admission. 9 We also asked about support for EU membership, and for NATO membership (in all cases, for the moment, a hypothetical question). As with 'Europeanness', support has been falling for European Union membership, and in all three countries. But it remains, on balance, a popular option, with many more supporters than opponents. Many more were either indifferent to the idea of EU membership or found it difficult to formulate a view; relatively small numbers (except in Ukraine in 2006, for reasons that may be connected with the EU's intervention into its domestic politics following its contested elections) were strongly opposed. As we might have expected, support for EU membership is closely related to 'Europeanness': those who thought of themselves as 'to a significant extent European' were more than three times as likely to be strongly in favour of EU membership as others, taking the Ukrainian figures for 2007 as an example. Respondents who had expressed a significant European identity were more likely to be able to identify the EU correctly, given a list of real and imaginary international organisations, and to locate its headquarters. Most strikingly of all, they were four or five times as likely as others to take a positive view of the EU and of its aims and activities; and those who took a positive view of the EU's aims and activities were in turn four or five times more likely to support the principle of membership. Support for NATO membership is predictably much lower, and has been declining further (Table 4) . Indeed, opposition is nowhere stronger, across the three countries, than in Ukraine, the only one of the countries under study in which the matter is under active discussion and in which the views of the public will, in principle, be decisive (on other evidence support for NATO membership has been falling steadily since at least 2000, when the question first began to be asked). 10 Based on our experience in piloting the questionnaire, we included an explicitly 'neutral' response, and this attracted the support of a plurality in Belarus and in Russia (in 2008, when 10 N. Panina, Ukraïnsk'e suspil 'stvo 1992 'stvo -2006 'stvo : sotsiologichnii monitoring (Ukraïni, 2006 48
Irish Studies in International Affairs
L u x e m b u r g 2 0 0 4 e n t r y E U 2 5 2 0 0 7 e n t r y Ir e la n d U K T u r k e y B e la r u s R u s s ia U k r a in e this option was not included, there was a substantial increase in 'don't know's). Substantial numbers, in every case, found it difficult to formulate a view. Support for NATO membership, as we might have expected, was closely associated with other views of the alliance. Supporters of NATO membership, for instance, were able to identify it more readily when they were given a list of real or imaginary international organisations, and they were more likely to see the alliance as a means of strengthening international security, although there were a few respondents who saw it as a 'base for Western expansion' but all the same wished to join.
LOOKING 'EAST'
For the 'lands in between', however, there is more than a Western choice: there is also an 'Eastern' choice, based on a primary identification with their opportunity to associate more closely with their Slavic neighbours. This is an association, as we saw at the outset, that rests on a much broader foundation than these countries' former membership of the USSR. It reflects a common history, and language, religious and other cultural affinities that have been little affected by the demise of the USSR. It is reflected in the audience for Russian-language media in the other two countries, particularly in Belarus (where three times as many watch Russian television channels as Belarusian ones). 11 Furthermore, it is reflected in the flow of foreign trade, which is itself a reflection of the fact that the Soviet economy was an integrated economic complex, with a network of road, rail and air communication that was centred on Moscow. More than half (55%) of all Belarusian foreign trade, for instance, is with other CIS countries, and 47% is with Russia alone. 12 Russia, as we have seen, is also Ukraine's largest trade partner, and the country that provides by far its largest numbers of foreign visitors. An 'Eastern' choice, however, reflects much more than economics: it also reflects the extent to which the Slavic and former Soviet republics were, and still continue to represent, a human community, with lengthy common frontiers, a common language, huge numbers of border crossings in both directions and family associations of all kinds. We tapped these interpersonal relations in several ways. We asked, for instance, if our Ukrainian respondents had close relatives living in Russia. Almost half (47%) had one or several, and nearly a quarter (23%) had close relatives living in other CIS member countries: in other words, approaching threequarters of our Ukrainian respondents had a close family association with at least one of the other former Soviet republics. Similarly, about two-thirds of our Ukrainian respondents had visited Russia, and 28% had visited Belarus; but just 4% had visited Hungary or the Czech Republic, let alone a Western capitalist country. In Belarus, nearly as many (63%) had a close relative living in Russia or another CIS member country, and the overwhelming majority had visited Russia (81%) or Ukraine (67%), but just 5% and 8%, respectively, had visited Hungary or the Czech Republic.
The Russian figures, in our 2008 survey, were very similar. More than a quarter (27%) had 'several' relatives in other CIS member states; another 11% had a single relative in another CIS member state. More than a quarter (28%) had visited Belarus; more like a half (44%) had at some point visited Ukraine. And more than a fifth (22%) had visited at least one of the Baltic republics. By contrast, no more than 6% had ever visited Germany, East or West. Foreign relations reflected a comparable pattern. For ordinary Russians in 2008, for instance, the United States was a much more serious potential threat to their security (46%) than the EU member countries or Russia's Slavic neighbour, Ukraine (16% and 15%, respectively). The same was true the other way round. Russians themselves, for instance, thought the United States was somewhat or entirely hostile towards them (52%), but only 9% took the same view of Belarusians or Kazakhs; and nearly 40% thought the 'colour revolutions' in the other former Soviet republics had been mostly the result of American intervention.
To test the nature of support for this alternative 'Slavic' orientation, we asked, first of all, if respondents regretted the demise of the USSR-indeed, if they thought it had been a 'disaster' (see Table 5 and Fig. 2) . Support for the USSR was clearly declining, and a plurality in both Belarus and Ukraine did not regret its demise at the time of our 2006 surveys; nevertheless, support is still very substantial (it was a plurality again in Ukraine in 2007), and it is consistently the majority view in Russia, where President Putin has himself described the USSR's demise as the 'greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century' in his annual address to the federal Table 6. parliament to 2005. 13 For Russians, 'the USSR' is in effect the Soviet system, with its positive as well as negative features. For Belarusians and Ukrainians, however, the era of the USSR was also a time in which their countries had been union republics and not independent states, in spite of their representation in the United Nations. To regret the demise of the USSR was in effect to regret the end of a period in which they had been ruled from Moscow, not by their own elected institutions; not to regret its demise was to affirm their national sovereignty, without necessarily rejecting the economic and political system that had prevailed at the same time.
There was less disagreement about the extent to which the post-Soviet republics should associate more closely, particularly within the Commonwealth of Independent States (Table 6 ). There was less support in Belarus and Ukraine than in Russia for the reconstitution of a unitary state, in effect a post-Soviet USSR; support for a unitary state was falling in each of the three countries, and support for the status quo was generally increasing. Even so, more than two-thirds in Belarus and Ukraine, and almost two-thirds in Russia, thought the former Soviet republics should at least cooperate more closely. There was almost no support, across the three countries, for the proposition that the CIS member countries should associate less closely than in the past, or that the organisation itself should be dissolved. Predictably, there was a close association between Soviet nostalgia and the belief that the former Soviet republics should integrate more closely: those who most regretted the demise of the USSR were more than twice as likely to believe that the former Soviet republics should reunite into a single state, and vice versa. But the clearest finding is the overwhelming level of public support across all three countries for a closer association, and, particularly in Russia, the substantial support that still exists for a reconstituted unitary state.
EAST OR WEST, BOTH OR NEITHER?
We have no wish to exaggerate the extent to which voting publics determine foreignpolicy choices, or the extent to which foreign policy considerations shape the choices of electors. In previous work, we have suggested that domestic publics may place 'outer limits on the foreign policies their governments have been able to pursue, even if issues of this kind have not figured prominently in recent elections'. 14 In each of 
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Irish Studies in International Affairs the countries we have considered in the present study there is substantial support for both a 'Western' and a 'Slavic choice', and each of these rival orientations has its origins in social characteristics, such as language, religion, education and income levels. More important, they are associated-particularly in Ukraine-with distinctive patterns of political mobilisation. A 'multi-vector' foreign policy incorporates both a Western and a Slavic orientation, and accommodates the rival constituencies that provide politicians with their electoral support. The greater these differences, and the more they relate to distinct domestic constituencies, the more difficult it will be for the governments of the region to abandon this dual orientation and commit themselves in one direction rather than the other; the greater the consensus, the less the political cost of doing so. Earlier work, including our own, has concentrated on a 'European choice' and sought to measure it by the level of support that exists for a hypothetical membership of the European Union. 15 In this paper we have explored a broader 'Western' orientation, combining attitudes towards EU membership with support or otherwise for NATO, and in this way tapping attitudes towards Western alliance systems as a whole, and not simply those that are geographically European. The two, as we have seen, are closely related; not only this, but they are closely related in the policies of the political actors of the region, particularly in Ukraine, where a 'Euro-Atlantic choice' incorporates them both. Similarly, we have taken account in the previous section of attitudes towards a closer association of the CIS member countries as well as of the views that are held about the demise of the USSR. The two, of course, are closely related, 16 but the relations that should exist among the members of the CIS are a matter of current controversy, which makes them a more directly comparable 'choice', whereas the widely shared view that the demise of the USSR is a matter for regret has no obvious policy consequences.
Cross-tabulating those who take a 'positive', 'negative' or 'neutral' view of each of these rival orientations produces a three-way table with nine ideal types, as set out in Fig. 3 . 'Pessimists', for instance, are opposed to either orientation (they are hostile to the idea of EU and NATO membership, but also hostile towards the closer integration of the CIS and not inclined to regret the passing of the USSR); 'optimists' are positive in every one of these respects. There are intermediate types as well: a strongly 'Western' orientation combined with a negative attitude towards a 'Slavic choice' yields a 'strongly Western' orientation; a strongly 'Slavic' orientation combined with a negative attitude towards EU and NATO membership produces a 'strongly Eastern' orientation. There are also 'ambivalents', who are neutral in both respects. The more domestic opinion is divided on these matters, the more a 'multi-vector' foreign policy is necessary to accommodate the two 15 See for instance Julia Korosteleva and Stephen White, ' "Feeling European": the view from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine', Contemporary Politics 12 (2) (June 2006), 193-205. 16 In Belarus the correlation between support for EU membership and for NATO membership was r = 0.42; in Ukraine r = 0.50; and in Russia r = 0.31. For demise of USSR and CIS integration the correlations were in Belarus r = 0.43; in Ukraine r = 0.42 and Russia r = 0.31. extremes; the more it is indifferent or united, the fewer the constraints on government action. How, then, are these ideal types distributed across the three countries? As Table  7 indicates, an 'Eastern' orientation is much more widely supported than its 'Western' equivalent and accounts for about half of those who provided responses in each of the three countries. This is what we might have expected, given the high levels of support for a closer relationship among the CIS member countries and substantial levels of regret about the demise of the USSR. Nevertheless, there were some notable variations. In particular, Ukraine was the most sharply polarised, with more who leaned towards the East but also more who leaned towards the West than in either of the other two countries; and there were more who were 'strongly East' or 'strongly West' oriented. In Belarus and Russia, there were almost as many who regretted the demise of the USSR and supported closer CIS integration as in Ukraine; but they were less inclined to do so emphatically, and less inclined to combine this with a simultaneous insistence on moving towards the EU and NATO.
As these patterns suggested, Ukraine was also the country in which there were the fewest 'ambivalents', with a neutral attitude towards either orientation; and it had the fewest 'optimists', with a favourable attitude towards both of them. In Belarus, 'ambivalents' were the most numerous group; in Russia, 'optimists' were the second most numerous; but in Ukraine, it was the 'strongly East' who were the most numerous of all. Accordingly, it was in Ukraine that public sympathies were most obviously divided, and it was here that opinion most directly underpinned the 'multivector' position that has normally been taken by its political leaders as they seek 'strategic partnerships' with their Eastern as well as Western neighbours. Opinion in Belarus and Russia is less polarised; accordingly, it draws on less distinct political communities; thus, it presents the fewest constraints to the conduct of official policy. Belarusian policy, as it happens, has also been a 'multi-vector' policy, while Russian 54 policy has normally attached a clear priority to relations with the other former Soviet republics; but both can make their choices without the need to take the same account of 'veto groups' within their domestic political environment. Russian foreign policy orientations have a number of distinctive features within this context. Russia, of course, is hardly a 'land in between', unless this is understood as a territory that extends across Europe and Asia; and these geopolitical differences need to be kept in mind when comparing its foreign policy orientations with those of Belarus and Ukraine. On our evidence, Russian foreign policy orientations are most distinctive for their 'moderation'. There is relatively more support for a Slavic choice than in either of the other two countries, and particularly large numbers who regret the demise of the USSR. The largest single group, however, are 'moderate' rather than more fundamentalist Easterners; the 'moderate Eastern' orientation they support does not necessarily exclude EU or NATO membership, though both are entirely hypothetical; and indeed (as we have seen) there are more 'optimists', who favour both orientations at the same time, than in either of the other two countries.
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CONCLUSION
The implications of these findings are perhaps the most significant for Ukraine, in that it is in Ukraine that foreign policy orientations are the most sharply polarised, the most closely associated with enduring cultural differences such as language and religion and the most obviously affected by the views of the mass electorate, particularly in relation to the possibility of NATO membership. The two orientations found their most direct expression in the divided and contentious results of the 2004-6 elections, and what appeared to be the rival foreign policies that were being promoted by president and prime minister, respectively, in the months that followed the appointment of the Yanukovych government in August 2006. The importance of public attitudes was underlined again in the commitment of the president and his associates to a programme of 'education' that was designed to shift them in a NATO direction, 17 a matter that was of importance to NATO itself. Belarus, although ostensibly more committed to a Slavic choice, would find it less difficult, on the evidence of these findings, to establish a closer relationship with the Western nations if those nations were disposed to allow its people and government to do so.
From a Russian perspective, our findings are more 'encouraging'. As we have seen, Russians are the most committed to a Slavic choice, the most likely to regret the demise of the USSR and the most likely to support the establishment of a unitary state that would include the other CIS member countries. On our own and other evidence, their orientation towards the former Soviet republics is also much more important to them than their orientation towards their European neighbours. 18 There is, accordingly, a close association between public attitudes and official policy, which has strongly asserted the Russian position in 'post-Soviet space' and sought to develop the Collective Security Treaty Organisation as a security framework within which Russian interests can be securely protected. Nevertheless, public attitudes are also open to a closer relationship with the EU and NATO, even membership, and much more concerned about Islamic fundamentalism and organised crime than the traditional threat that is represented by the Western powers and their military or economic alliances. An orientation of this kind, we have suggested, reflects the issues of identity and culture to which the constructivists have drawn attention; the more the political process in the three countries allows them to be articulated, the more powerfully they will constrain the actions of their governments.
APPENDIX
Our surveys were conducted by local agencies according to a specification determined by the investigators and following international best practice. Interviews were conducted face to face in respondents' homes; samples were representative of the population aged 18 and over, using a multistage proportional method with a random route method of selecting households. Agencies conducted their own checks on the completion of questionnaires and the logical consistency of the data. The original data and supporting documentation are generally available for inspection through the UK Data Archive.
In Belarus our 2000 survey was conducted by Novak under the direction of Andrei Vardomatsky, and fielded between 13 and 27 April; there were 62 sampling points, and 90 interviewers (n = 1090). 
